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Abstract
Fairness for Machine Learning has received considerable attention, recently. Various mathe-
matical formulations of fairness have been proposed, and it has been shown that it is impossible to
satisfy all of them simultaneously. The literature so far has dealt with these impossibility results
by quantifying the tradeoffs between different formulations of fairness. Our work takes a different
perspective on this issue. Rather than requiring all notions of fairness to (partially) hold at the
same time, we ask which one of them is the most appropriate given the societal domain in which
the decision-making model is to be deployed. We take a descriptive approach and set out to iden-
tify the notion of fairness that best captures lay people’s perception of fairness. We run adaptive
experiments designed to pinpoint the most compatible notion of fairness with each participant’s
choices through a small number of tests. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the most simplistic
mathematical definition of fairness—namely, demographic parity—most closely matches people’s
idea of fairness in two distinct application scenarios. This conclusion remains intact even when we
explicitly tell the participants about the alternative, more complicated definitions of fairness, and
we reduce the cognitive burden of evaluating those notions for them. Our findings have important
implications for the Fair ML literature and the discourse on formalizing algorithmic fairness.
1 Introduction
Machine Learning tools are increasingly employed to make consequential decisions for human subjects,
in areas such as credit lending [Petrasic et al., 2017], policing [Rudin, 2013], criminal justice [Barry-
Jester et al., 2015], and medicine [Deo, 2015]. Decisions made by these algorithms can have a long-
lasting impact on people’s lives and may affect certain individuals or social groups negatively [Sweeney,
2013; Angwin et al., 2016]. This realization has recently spawned an active area of research into
quantifying and guaranteeing fairness for machine learning [Dwork et al., 2012; Kleinberg et al., 2017;
Hardt et al., 2016].
Despite the recent surge of interest in Fair ML, there is no consensus on a precise definition of
(un)fairness. Numerous mathematical definitions of fairness have been proposed; examples include
demographic parity [Dwork et al., 2012], disparate impact [Zafar et al., 2017], equality of odds [Hardt
et al., 2016; Feldman et al., 2015], and calibration [Kleinberg et al., 2017]. While each of these notions
is appealing on its own, it has been shown that they are incompatible with one another and cannot
hold simultaneously [Kleinberg et al., 2017; Chouldechova, 2017]. The literature so far has dealt with
these impossibility results by attempting to quantify the tradeoffs between different formulations of
fairness, hoping that practitioners will be better positioned to determine the extent to which the
violation of each fairness criterion can be socially tolerated (see, e.g., [Corbett-Davies et al., 2017]).
Our work takes a different perspective on these impossibility results. We posit that fairness is a
highly context-dependent ideal and depending on the societal domain in which the decision-making
model is deployed, one mathematical notion of fairness may be considered ethically more desirable
than other alternatives. So rather than requiring all notions of fairness to (partially) hold at the same
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time, we set out to determine the most suitable notion of fairness for the particular domain at hand.
Because algorithmic predictions ultimately impact people’s lives, we argue that the most appropriate
notion of algorithmic fairness is the one that reflects people’s idea of fairness in the given context.
We, therefore, take a descriptive ethics approach to identify the mathematical notion of fairness
that most closely matches lay people’s perception of fairness.
Our primary goal is to test the following hypotheses:1
• H1: In the context of recidivism risk assessment, the majority of subjects’ responses is compat-
ible with equality of false negative/positive rates across demographic groups.
• H2: In the context of medical predictions, the majority of subjects’ responses is compatible
with equality of accuracy across demographic groups.
• H3: When the decision-making stakes are high (e.g., when algorithmic predictions affect people’s
life expectancy) participants are more sensitive to accuracy as opposed to equality.
Our first hypothesis is inspired by the recent media coverage of the COMPAS criminal risk assessment
tool and its potential bias against African-American defendants [Angwin et al., 2016]. Our second
hypothesis is informed by the growing concern over the fact that medical experiments are largely
conducted with white males as subjects and as a result, their conclusions are reliable only for that
particular segment of the population [Taylor and Wright, 2005]. Such biases can only be amplified by
Machine Learning tools [Hart, 2017]. Our third hypothesis explores the tension between inequality
aversion and accuracy.
In order to determine the notion of fairness that is most compatible with a participant’s perception
of fairness, we design an adaptive experiment based on active learning. Each participant is required
to answer a series of at most 20 adaptively chosen tests—all concerning a fixed, carefully specified
scenario (e.g., predicting the risk of future crime for defendants). Each question specifies the ground
truth labels for ten hypothetical decision subjects, along with the labels predicted for them by two
hypothetical predictive models./algorithms (see Figure 1). The participant is then prompted to choose
which of the two algorithms they consider to be more discriminatory. The tests are chosen by an active
learning algorithm, called EC2 [Golovin et al., 2010; Ray et al., 2012]. Depending on the participant’s
choices so far, the EC2 algorithm chooses the next test. Note that an active learning scheme is
necessary for pinpointing the most compatible notion through a small number of tests. Without an
adaptive design, participants would have to answer hundreds of questions before we can confidently
specify the notion of fairness that is most compatible with their choices.
We run our experiments on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform and report the percent-
age of participants whose choices match each mathematical notion of fairness. We also investigate how
this varies from one context to another and from one demographic group to another. Surprisingly, we
find that the most simplistic mathematical definition of fairness—namely, demographic parity—most
closely matches people’s idea of fairness in two distinct scenarios. This remains the case even when
subjects are explicitly told about the alternative, more complicated definitions of fairness and the
cognitive burden of evaluating those notions is reduced for them. Our findings have important impli-
cations for the Fair ML literature. In particular, they accentuate the need for a more comprehensive
understanding of the human attitude toward fairness for predictive models.
In summary, we provide a comparative answer to the ethical question of “what is the most ap-
propriate notion of fairness to guarantee in a given societal context?”. Our framework can be readily
adapted to scenarios beyond the ones studied here. As the Fair ML literature continues to grow, we
believe it is critical for all stakeholders—including people who are potential subjects of algorithmic
decision-making in their daily lives—to be heard and involved in the process of formulating fairness.
Our work takes an initial step toward this agenda. After all, a theory of algorithmic fairness can only
have a meaningful positive impact on society if it reflects people’s sense of justice.
1All hypotheses were defined and registered with our institution in advance of the experiments.
2
Figure 1: A typical test in our experiments. Each test illustrates the predictions made by two hy-
pothetical algorithms (A1 and A2) along with the true labels for ten hypothetical individual decision
subjects. Decision subjects’ race and gender are color-coded. A pink/blue background specifies a fe-
male/male decision-subject. A beige/brown contour specifies a Caucasian/African- American decision
subject. The demographic characteristics of decision subjects are kept constant across all tests. With
this information, the participant responds to the test by selecting the algorithm he/she considers to
be discriminatory.
1.1 Related Work
Much of the existing work on algorithmic fairness has been devoted to the study of discrimination
(also called statistical - or group-level fairness) for binary classification. Statistical notions require a
particular metric—quantifying benefit or harm—to be equal across different social groups (e.g., gender
or racial groups). Different choices for the benefit metric have led to different fairness criteria; examples
include Demographic Parity (DP) [Dwork et al., 2012], Error Parity (EP) [Buolamwini and Gebru,
2018], equality of False Positive or False Negative rates (FPP and FNP, respectively) [Zafar et al.,
2017; Hardt et al., 2016], and False Discovery or Omission rates (FDP and FOP, respectively) [Zafar
et al., 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2017]. Demographic parity seeks to equalize the percentage of people
who are predicted to be positive across different groups. Equality of false positive/negative rates
requires the percentage of people falsely predicted to be positive/negative to be the same across
true negative/positive individuals belonging to each group. Equality of false discovery/omission rates
seeks to equalize the percentage of false positive/negative predictions among individuals predicted to
be positive/negative in each group. See Table 1 for the precise definition of benefit corresponding to
each notion of these notions of fairness.
Table 1: The measure of benefit/harm corresponding to each notion of fairness. For a decision subject
i belonging to group G, yi specifies his/her true label, and yˆi his/her predicted label. nG is the number
of individuals belonging to group G.
Fairness notion benefit for group G
DP bG = 1nG
∑
i∈G 1[yˆi = 1]
EP bG = 1nG
∑
i∈G 1[yˆi 6= yi]
FDP bG =
∑
i∈G 1[yi=0&yˆi=1]∑
i∈G 1[yˆi=1]
FNP bG =
∑
i∈G 1[yˆi=0&yi=1]∑
i∈G 1[yi=1]
Following Speicher et al. [2018], we extend these existing notions of fairness to measures of un-
fairness by employing inequality indices, and in particular the Generalized Entropy index. Given the
benefit vector, b, computed for all groups G = 1, · · · , N , the Generalized Entropy (with exponent
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α = 2) is calculated as follows:
E(b) = E(b1, b2, · · · , bN ) = 1
2n
N∑
G=1
[(
bG
µ
)2
− 1
]
. (1)
where µ = 1N
∑N
G=1 bG is the average benefit across all groups.
In ethics, there are two distinct ways of addressing moral dilemmas: descriptive vs. normative
approach. Normative ethics involves creating or evaluating moral standards to decide what people
should do or whether their current moral behavior is reasonable. Descriptive (or comparative) ethics
is a form of empirical research into the attitudes of individuals or groups of people towards morality
and moral decision-making. Our work belongs to the descriptive category. Several prior papers have
taken a normative perspective on algorithmic fairness. For instance, Gajane and Pechenizkiy [2017]
attempt to cast algorithmic notions of fairness as instances of existing theories of justice. Heidari et
al. [2019] propose a framework for evaluating the assumptions underlying different notions of fairness
by casting them as special cases of economic models of equality of opportunity. We emphasize that
there is no simple, widely-accepted, normative principle to settle the ethical problem of algorithmic
fairness.
Several recent papers empirically investigate the issues of fairness and interpretability utilizing
human-subject experiments. Below we elaborate on some of the prior work in this line. MIT’s moral
machine [Awad et al., 2018] provides a crowd-sourcing platform for aggregating human opinion on
how self-driving cars should make decisions when faced with moral dilemmas. For the same setting,
Noothigattu et al. [2018] propose learning a random utility model of individual preferences, then
efficiently aggregating those individual preferences through a social choice function. [Lee et al., 2018]
proposes a similar approach for general ethical decision-making. Similar to these papers, we obtain
input from human-participants by asking them to compare two alternatives from a moral standpoint.
Noothigattu et al. and Lee et al. focus on modeling human preferences and aggregating them utilizing
tools from social choice theory. In contrast, our primary goal is to understand the relationship between
human perception and the recently proposed mathematical formulations of fairness.
Grgic-Hlaca et al. [2018] study why people perceive the use of certain features as unfair in making
a prediction about individuals. Binns et al. [2018] study people’s perceptions of justice in algorithmic
decision-making under different explanation styles and at a high level show that there may be no
“best” approach to explaining algorithmic decisions to people. Veale et al. [2018] interview public
sector machine learning practitioners regarding the challenges of incorporating public values into
their work. Holstein et al. [2018] conduct a systematic investigation of commercial product teams’
challenges and needs in developing fairer ML systems through semi-structured interviews. Unlike our
work where the primary focus is on lay people and potential decision subjects, Holstein et al. and
Veale et al. study ML practitioners’ views toward fairness.
Several recent papers in human-computer interaction study users’ expectations and perceptions
related to fairness of algorithms. Lee and Baykal [2017] investigate people’s perceptions of fair division
algorithms (e.g., those designed to divide rent among tenants) compared to discussion-based group
decision-making methods. Woodruff et al. [2018] conduct workshops and interviews with participants
belonging to certain marginalized groups (by race or class) in the US to understand their reactions to
algorithmic unfairness.
To our knowledge, no prior work has conducted experiments with the goal of mapping existing
group definitions of fairness to human perception of justice. Saxena et al. [2018] investigate ordinary
people’s attitude toward three notions of individual fairness in the context of loan decisions. They
investigate the following three notions: 1) treating similar individuals similarly [Dwork et al., 2012]; 2)
never favoring a worse individual over a better one [Joseph et al., 2016]; 3) the probability of approval
being proportional to the chance of the individual representing the best choice. They show that people
exhibit a preference for the last fairness definition—which is similar, in essence, to calibration.
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2 Study Design and Methodology
To test H1 and H2, we conducted human-subject experiments on AMT to determine which one of the
existing notions of group fairness best captures people’s idea of fairness in the given societal context.
For our final hypothesis, H3, we utilized short survey questions (see Section 4 for further details).
2.1 User Interfaces
In our experiments, each participant was asked to respond to a maximum of 20 tests. In each test,
we showed the participant the predictions made by two hypothetical algorithms for ten hypothetical
individuals, along with the true labels (see Figure 1). We limited attention to tests that consist of
algorithms with equal overall accuracy to control for the impact of accuracy on people’s perception.
Note that the pair of algorithms displayed in each test changes from one test to another. We asked
the participant to specify which algorithm they consider to be more discriminatory. The tests were
chosen adaptively to find the notion of fairness most compatible with the participant’s choices using
only a small number of tests. The participant was then required to provide an explanation for their
choice.
To elicit the explanations, we designed and tested two different User Interfaces (UI). The first
UI presents the participant with a text box, allowing them to provide an unstructured explana-
tion/reasoning for their choice. The second UI requires the participant to provide a structured expla-
nation, and it consists of two drop-down menus. In the first dropdown menu, the participant must
choose the demographic characteristic they think the algorithm is most discriminatory with respect to
(that is, gender, race, or the intersection of the two). In the second drop-down menu, they choose the
metric along which the think the algorithm is most discriminatory. To reduce the cognitive burden,
we computed the benefit metric corresponding to each notion of fairness and displayed it in the second
drop-down menu. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: The user interface eliciting structured explanations from participants. All benefit metrics
are computed and displayed to reduce the cognitive burden of evaluating our fairness notions.
We validated our interface design through two rounds of pilot studies—one internal (among mem-
bers of our research group) and one on AMT (among 20 crowd workers). We made some minor changes
after our internal run to improve readability of the task description. The AMT pilot participants found
our first user interface (the one with text explanations) less restrictive and easier to work with, so we
scaled up our experiments to 100 crowd workers per scenario using that interface.
2.2 Scenarios and Contexts
We ran our experiments for two distinct prediction tasks: criminal and skin cancer risk prediction.
Below we describe each scenario precisely as it was shown to the study participants.
Criminal risk prediction Across the United States, data-driven decision-making algorithms are
increasingly employed to predict the likelihood of future crimes by defendants. These algorithmic
predictions are utilized by judges to make sentencing decisions for defendants (e.g., setting the bond
amount; time to be spent in jail). Data-driven decision-making algorithms use historical data about past
defendants to learn about factors that highly correlate with criminality. For instance, the algorithm may
learn from past data that: 1) a defendant with a lengthy criminal history is more likely to reoffend if set
free—compared to a first-time defender, or 2) defendants belonging to certain groups (e.g., residents of
neighborhoods with high crime rate) are more likely to reoffend if set free. However, algorithms are not
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Figure 3: The advantage of adaptive over random test selection. For each of the four notions of fairness,
we simulated a participant who follows that notion—as defined by our noisy response model—for 1000
tests. (Top) With a random test sequence, at least 600 tests are needed before we can obtain a high
likelihood for one hypothesis. (Bottom) With our adaptive test selection method, only around 20 tests
are needed to assign a high likelihood to the fairness notion the participant is following.
perfect, and they inevitably make errors—-although the error rate is usually very low, the algorithm’s
decision can have a significant impact on some defendants’ lives. A defendant falsely predicted to
reoffend can unjustly face longer sentences, while a defendant falsely predicted not to reoffend may
commit a crime that was preventable.
Skin cancer risk prediction Data-driven algorithms are increasingly employed to diagnose various
medical conditions, such as risk for heart disease or various forms of cancer. They can find patterns and
links in medical records that previously required great levels of expertise and time from human doctors.
Algorithmic diagnoses are then used by health-care professionals to create personalized treatment plans
for patients (e.g., whether the patient should undergo surgery or chemotherapy). Data-driven decision-
making algorithms use historical data about past patients to learn about factors that highly correlate
with risk of cancer. For instance, the algorithm may learn from past data that: 1) a patient with a
family history of skin cancer has a higher risk of developing skin cancer; or 2) patients belonging to
certain groups (e.g., people with a certain skin tone, or people of a certain gender) are more likely to
develop skin cancer. However, algorithms are not perfect, and they inevitably make errors—although
the error rate is usually very low, the algorithm’s decision can have a significant impact on patients’
lives. A patient falsely diagnosed with high risk of cancer may unnecessarily undergo high-risk and
costly medical treatments, while a patient falsely labeled as low-risk for cancer may face a lower chance
of survival.
2.3 Adaptive Experimental Design
Each run of our experiment consists of sequentially selecting among a set of noisy tests and observing
the participant’s response to it. These tests are time-consuming for participants to evaluate and they
can quickly become repetitive.2 So to limit the number of tests per participant, we employed an
active learning scheme proposed by Golovin et al. [2010]. This allowed us to determine the most
compatible fairness notion with each participant’s choices, employing at most 20 tests per participant
(see Figure 3). The algorithm, called EC2 (for Equivalence Class Edge Cutting algorithm), can handle
noisy observations and its expected cost is competitive with that of the optimal sequential policy.
The EC2 algorithm At a high level, the algorithm works as follows: it designates an equivalence
class for each notion of fairness. In our setting, we have four equivalence classes representing Demo-
graphic Parity (DP), Error Parity (EP), False Discovery rate Parity (FDP), and False Negative rate
Parity (FNP). (For experiments with a different set of hypotheses excluding DP and including other
group notions of fairness, such as False Positive Parity (FPP) and False Omission Parity (FOP), see
2Every participant who completed our task was paid 5 USD.
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Appendix 9.) We use the notation h1, h2, h3, h4 to refer to these notions, respectively. We assume a
uniform prior over h1, · · · , h4.
Let τ denote the number of all possible tests we can run. In our case, τ = 9262. We assume the
cost is uniform across all tests. The outcome of each test is binary (the participant chooses one of the
two algorithms as more discriminatory), so there will be 2τ possible test outcome profiles, where a
test outcome profile specifies the outcome of all τ tests. For each test outcome profile, EC2 computes
the fairness notion that maximizes the posterior probability of that outcome profile; we call this the
MAP fairness notion for the outcome profile. EC2 puts each outcome profile in the equivalence class
corresponding to its MAP fairness notion.
EC2 introduces edges between any two outcome profiles that belong to different equivalence classes.
As the algorithm progresses, some edges are cut, and the algorithm terminates when no edge is left.
At a high level, in each step, the algorithm picks the test that if run, in expectation removes as much
of the remaining edge weights as possible.3
The Bayesian update Let T denote the set of all available tests, and A the set of tests already
carried out in the preceding steps. Let Ot = denote the outcome of the test currently administered,
denoted by t (i.e., Ot ∈ {A1, A2}), and o, the vector of outcomes of tests in A. Then at each step we
select the test t ∈ T −A such that the following objective function is maximized:
4(t|o) =
 ∑
o∈{A1,A2}
P(Ot = o|o)
(∑
i
P(hi|o, Ot = o)2
)−∑
i
P(hi|o)2
The objective function for each candidate test is computed as follows:4 We assume a uniform prior on
our four hypotheses, that is, for h ∈ {h1 · · · , h4}, P(h) = 1/4. We assume conditional independence,
that is, P(o|h) = ∏o∈o P(o|h). We have that P(o) = ∑h P(o|h)P(h) and P(h|o) = P(o|h)P(h)P(o) . More-
over, P(Ot = o|o) =
∑
h P(Ot = o|h)P(h|o). Calculating P(Ot = o|h) requires modeling participant’s
fairness assessments, which we discuss next.
Modeling participants’ fairness assessments After observing the participant’s response to a
test, EC2 needs to update the posterior probability of each notion of fairness. This requires us to
specify a model of how the participant responds to each test conditioned on their preferred notion of
fairness. We assume5 that the probability of an individual following hi selecting A1 is as follows:
P (A1|hi) = softmax (E(bi,1), E(bi,2)) (2)
where bi,1 = 〈bGi,1〉 group G and bi,2 = 〈bGi,2〉 group G are the group-level benefit vectors for A1 and A2
respectively. E(b) is the Generalized Entropy index, a measure of inequality, computed over the benefit
vector b. For the benefit vector corresponding to each notion of fairness, see Table 1.
Figure 4 shows the outcome of our adaptive experiments, assuming that participants choose their
answer to each test uniformly at random.
3 Experimental Findings
Through our experiments on AMT, we gathered a data set consisting of
• 100 participants’ responses to our tests for the crime risk prediction scenario;
• 100 participants’ responses to our tests for the skin cancer risk prediction scenario.
3We implemented an efficient approximation of EC2, called the EffECXtive (Efficient Edge Cutting approXimate
objective) algorithm.
4The implementation makes use of memorization in order to speed up the computation and achieve a responsive user
interface.
5There are numerous alternative assumptions we could have made; we consider ours to be one reasonable choice.
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Figure 4: The outcome of our adaptive experiment if the response to each test is chosen at random.
The chance of DP being selected as the most compatible hypothesis is not high.
We asked the participants to provide us with their demographic information, such as their age, gender,
race, education, and political affiliation. The purpose of asking these questions was to understand
whether there are significant variations in perceptions of fairness across different demographic groups.6
Table 2 summarizes the demographic information of our participants and contrasts it with the 2016
U.S. census data. In general, AMT workers are not a representative sample of the U.S. population
(they often belong to a particular segment of the population—those that have Internet access and are
willing to complete crowdsourced tasks online). In particular, for our experiments, participants were
younger and more liberal compared to the average U.S. population.
Table 2: Demographics of our AMT participants compared to the 2016 U.S. census data.
Demographic Attribute AMT Census
Male 53% 49%
Female 47% 51%
Caucausian 68% 61%
African-American 12% 13%
Asian 10% 6%
Hispanic 6% 18%
Liberal 74% 33%
Conservative 19% 29%
High school 31% 40%
College degree 48% 48%
Graduate degree 20% 11%
18–25 14% 10%
25–40 67% 20%
40–60 16% 26%
3.1 Quantitative Results
For the crime risk prediction scenario, Figure 5 shows the number of participants whose responses
were compatible with each notion of fairness, along with the confidence with which the EC2 algorithm
puts them in that category. Demographic parity best captures the choices made by the majority of our
participants. Trends are similar for the cancer risk prediction scenario. See Table 3 for the summary.
If we exclude DP from the set of hypotheses (and include other group notions of fairness), the
majority of participants can’t be confidently categorized as following either one of our hypotheses.
This supports our original finding that DP best captures most participants’ perception of fairness.
See Appendix 9 for further detail.
6Answering to this part was entirely optional and did not affect the participant’s eligibility for participation or
monetary compensation.
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Table 3: Number of participants matched with each notion with high likelihood (> 80%).
DP EP FDR FNP none
Crime risk prediction 80% 0% 2% 4% 14%
Cancer risk prediction 73% 3% 0% 0% 24%
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Figure 5: The crime risk prediction scenario—the number of participants matched with each notion
of fairness (y-axis) along with the likelihood levels (x-axis). Demographic parity captures the choices
made by the majority of participants.
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Figure 6: The cancer risk prediction scenario—the number of participants matched with each notion
of fairness (y-axis) along with the likelihood levels (x-axis). Demographic parity captures the choices
made by the majority of participants.
Sensitivity to explanation interface To test the sensitivity of our findings to the design of the
user interface, we experimented (at a smaller scale with 20 participants) with an interface that elicits
structured explanations from the participant. The interface explicitly shows the disparities across
h1, · · · , h4. Through this interface, we prompted the participant to think about the fairness notions
of interest and reduced the cognitive burden of evaluating those notions for them. We observe that
even under this new condition the majority of participants made choices that are best captured by
demographic parity. For the crime prediction scenario, 17 out of 20 participants were matched with
DP, and for the cancer prediction scenario, this number was 9 out of 20.
Variation across gender, race, age, education, and political views We did not observe
significant variation across any demographic attribute. For the crime risk prediction scenario, the
percentage of subjects whose likelihood of following DP is high (> 80%) is as follows:
• 78% for female, and 79% for male participants;
• 82% for Caucasian, and 72% for non-Caucasian participants;
• 80% for liberal, and 74% for conservative participants;
• 77% for participants with no college/university degree, and 79% for the rest;
• 78% for young participants (with age < 40), and 81% for older participants.
3.2 Qualitative Results
Table 4 shows several instances of the explanations provided by the participants in each category. For
example, a participant categorized by our system as following the Error Parity hypothesis provided
an explanation that focused on the accuracy rate within demographic groups. These explanations
demonstrate the ability for human participants to provide explanations in free text that can align with
mathematical notions of fairness, without being prompted to think along these statistical definitions.
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Figure 7: Trajectories of two different participants, one with a high final likelihood on DP and one
with a low final likelihood on any fairness notion. Explanations provided by the former participant
demonstrates consistency with an explanation aligned with demographic parity—addressing the pre-
dictions without considering ground truth labels. Explanations provided by the latter participant
demonstrates inconsistency across different fairness notions.
Table 4: Typical explanations provided by participants in each category.
Category Explanation
DP “It expected only black females to
reoffend.”
EP “Algorithm 1 made more correct
decisions for white people.”
FDR “White males are incorrectly la-
beled likely to reoffend more often
by this algorithm than the other.”
FNR “Two white males who did reof-
fend, both received will not reof-
fend status.”
The free text explanations provided by participants present us with insight into their trajectories,
and why a small number of participants could not be confidently categorized as either one of the
four notions. Figure 7 compares the trajectories of two participants - one categorized as following
Demographic Parity with high confidence, and another participant who is not confidently categorized
into any metric. The latter participant’s explanations vary across time steps, from considering false
negative rates to accuracy within demographic groups. These inconsistent explanations support our
system’s inability to assign a fairness notion with high confidence.
4 Survey Design and Analysis
To test H3, we presented participants with three algorithms, each offering a different trade-off between
accuracy and equality. We asked our participants to choose the one they consider ethically more
desirable. For the case of medical risk prediction, we performed this survey for two different scenarios:
1) predicting the risk of skin cancer (high-stakes), and predicting the severity of flu symptoms (low
stakes). We hypothesized that when the stakes are high, more participants would choose high overall
accuracy ( i.e., A1) over low inequality (i.e., A3). Similarly, for the case of criminal risk assessment, we
conducted the survey for both a high-stakes (predictions used to determine jail time) and a low-stakes
scenario (predictions used to set bail amount.) Below we lay out the questionnaires precisely as they
were presented to the survey participants.
Skin cancer risk prediction Data-driven algorithms are increasingly employed to screen and pre-
dict the risk of various forms of diseases, such as skin cancer. They can find patterns and links in
medical records that previously required great levels of expertise and time from human doctors. Algo-
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Table 5: Three hypothetical algorithms offering distinct tradeoffs between accuracy and inequality.
Algorithm accuracy female acc. male acc.
A1 94% 89% 99%
A2 91% 90% 92%
A3 86% 86% 86%
rithmic predictions are then utilized by health-care professionals to create the appropriate treatment
plans for patients. Suppose we have three skin cancer risk prediction algorithms and would like to
decide which one should be deployed for cancer screening of patients in a hospital. Each algorithm has
a specific level of accuracy—where accuracy specifies the percentage of subjects for whom the algorithm
makes a correct prediction. See Table 5. Note that in cases where the deployed algorithm makes an
error, a patient’s life can be severely impacted. A patient falsely predicted to have high risk of skin
cancer may unnecessarily undergo high-risk and costly medical interventions, while a patient falsely
labeled as low risk for skin cancer may face a significantly lower life expectancy. From a moral stand-
point, which one of the following three algorithms do you think is more desirable for deployment in
real-world hospitals?
Flu symptom severity prediction Data-driven algorithms can be employed to screen and predict
the risk of various forms of diseases, including common flu. They can find patterns and links in
medical records that previously required visiting a human doctor. Algorithmic predictions can be utilized
by patients to decide whether to see a doctor for their symptoms. Suppose we have three different
algorithms predicting the severity of flu symptoms in patients and would like to decide which one
should be deployed in the real world. Each algorithm has a specific level of accuracy—where accuracy
specifies the percentage of subjects for whom the algorithm makes a correct prediction. Note that in
cases where the deployed algorithm makes an error, a patient will be temporarily impacted negatively.
A patient falsely predicted to develop severe flu symptoms may unnecessarily seek medical intervention,
while a patient falsely labeled as developing only mild symptoms may have to cope with severe symptoms
for a longer period of time (at most two weeks).
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Figure 8: Medical risk prediction scenarios. Participants gave higher weight to accuracy (compared
to inequality) when predictions can impact patients’ life expectancy.
Figures 9 and 8 show the number of participants who chose each algorithm. As hypothesized,
when the stakes are high, participants gave higher weight to accuracy and lower weight to inequality.
5 Discussion
The main takeaway message from our experiments is that demographic parity best captures
people’s perception of fairness. Our surveys show that participants consider accuracy more
important than equality when stakes are high. Finally, participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk found the task engaging and informative, while some thought more context about the algorithm
and decision subjects would have helped them make a more informed choice. Feedback from the users,
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Figure 9: Crime risk prediction scenarios. Participants gave higher weight to accuracy (compared to
inequality) when predictions can impact defendants’ life trajectory.
Table 6: Examples of participant feedback demonstrating positive educational effect of the task.
Instance Feedback
1 “It was more difficult than I first thought to choose an algorithm. The question must
come up: is it discriminatory to predict correctly? This is something to mull over. Thank
you!”
2 “I would have liked to know age and education to see if those were also factors though.”
3 “This was really fun, thank you! I’ve never realized that algorithms were used for this
sort of data, I hope this helps in some way to improve those systems.”
4 “The justice system’s algorithms think very poorly of white men and black women. That’s
frightening if true.”
5 “I thought this was really interesting! I’d be curious what the results say.”
such as the examples shown in Table 6, demonstrate that our task encouraged users to think about
what factors algorithmic decision-making systems should take into account, as well as reflect about
the use of discriminatory algorithms in society.
5.1 Limitations
The primary goal of our work was to find out which existing notion of fairness best captures lay people’s
perception of fairness in a given context. We took it as a given that at least one of these notions is
a good representation of human judgment—at least in the highly stylized setting we presented them
with. We acknowledge that real-world scenarios are always much more complex and there are many
factors (beyond true and predicted labels) that impact people’s judgment of the situation. Existing
mathematical notions of fairness are in comparison very simplistic, and they can never reflect all
the nuances involved. Our work is by no means a final verdict—it is an initial step toward a better
understanding of fairness and justice from the perspective of everyday people.
One barrier to obtaining meaningful answers from participants is engagement. On AMT it is
difficult to monitor participants’ attention to the task. We were particularly concerned about the
possibility of participants choosing their answers without careful consideration of all factors in front
of them—and in the worst case, completely at random. We prevented this by
• Restricting participation to turkers with 99% approval rate.
• Limiting the number of tests to at most 20.
• Requiring the participant to provide an explanation for their choice.
• Restricting participants to complete the task at most once.
As with any experiment, we cannot completely rule out the potential impact of framing. We
experimented with two different UIs, and our findings were robust to that choice. This, however, does
not mean that a different experimental setting could not lead to different conclusions. In particular,
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in our experiments, participants did not have personal stakes in their choice of algorithm, and they
might have responded differently if they could be the subject of decision making through their choice
of algorithm.
In all of our tests, we restricted attention to two predictive models of similar accuracy. How do
participants’ perception of discrimination change if the two models presented to them differ in terms
of accuracy? We leave the study of the role of accuracy for future work.
5.2 Future Directions
Our findings have important implications for the Fair ML literature. In particular, they accentuate
the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the human attitude toward algorithmic fairness.
Algorithmic decisions will ultimately impact human subjects’ lives, and it is, therefore, critical to
involve them in the process of choosing the right notion of fairness. Our work takes an initial step
toward this broader agenda. Directions for future work include, but are not limited to, the following:
• providing subjects with more information about subjects of algorithmic decision making and
inner workings of each algorithm; quantifying how this additional context affects their assessment
of algorithmic fairness.
• providing subjects with information about the non-algorithmic alternatives (i.e., cost, accuracy,
and bias of human decisions)
• exploring fairness considerations at different levels; are people more sensitive to individual- or
group-level unfairness?
• studying the role of personal stakes; do people assess algorithmic fairness differently if they may
be personally affected by algorithmic decisions?
• studying the effect of participant’s expertise; does expertise in law and discrimination qualita-
tively change the participants’ responses?
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7 Reproducibility
7.1 Task Interface
Each of the 20 tests were adaptively selected based on the participant’s answers to previous tests, with
the first test provided at random. A return code was provided for AMT participants to give back to
us after they finished all 20 tests—this allowed us to link AMT participants survey responses (i.e.,
demographic information and feedback) with the logs of server interactions that we maintained.
7.2 Code
The code for our server, implementation of adaptive test selection, and analysis can all be found
on our Git Repository: https://github.com/meghabyte/FairnessPerceptions/. A more detailed
description of how to run the code and reproduce the plots in our paper can be found in the repository’s
ReadMe. A very brief description follows:
Amazon Mechanical Turk data All raw data from our Amazon Mechanical Turk experiments can
be found under the data folder in the repository. These consist of server logs tracking all interactions
with the server. We also provide the following processed data files:
• A file combining each participant’s data with their likelihoods across hypotheses/explanation
after 20 tests;
• A file containing results from our pilot experiments (including the drop-down user interface that
we chose to not use in our full experiments).
To respect the participants privacy, we do not release any data consisting of their identifying informa-
tion, demographics, and feedback.
Analysis All plots from our paper, as well as the code to re-generate them, can be found in the
analysis folder in the repository.
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Interface Our interface can be run locally as well as a test mode where either random test selection
(see Figure 3) or random answer generation (see Figure 4) can be simulated. All command line
arguments are explained in the repository.
8 Additional Surveys
Sentencing time in prison Data-driven decision-making algorithms can be employed to predict the
likelihood of future crime by defendants. These algorithmic predictions are utilized by judges to make
sentencing decisions for defendants, in particular, how much time the defendant has to spend in prison.
Suppose we have three different algorithms predicting the risk of future crime for defendants and would
like to decide which one should be deployed in real-world courtrooms. Each algorithm has a specific
level of accuracy—where accuracy specifies the percentage of subjects for whom the algorithm makes
a correct prediction. See Table 5. Note that in cases where the deployed algorithm makes an error, a
defendant’s life can be significantly impacted: A defendant falsely predicted to re-offend can unjustly
face long prison sentences (minimum 1 year), while a defendant falsely predicted to not reoffend will
not spend any time in prison and may commit a serious crime that could have been prevented. From
a moral standpoint, which one of the three algorithms do you think is more desirable for deployment
in real-world courtrooms?
Setting the bail amount Data-driven decision-making algorithms can be employed to predict the
likelihood of a defendant appearing in court for his/her future hearings. These algorithmic predictions
can be utilized by judges to set the appropriate bail amount for the defendant. Suppose we have three
different algorithms predicting the risk of a defendant not showing up to future court hearings and
we would like to decide which one should be deployed in real-world courtrooms. Each algorithm has a
specific level of accuracy—where accuracy specifies the percentage of subjects for whom the algorithm
makes a correct prediction. Note that in cases where the deployed algorithm makes an error, the
defendant may be financially impacted: A defendant falsely predicted to not appear for future hearings
is unnecessarily forced to submit a bail amount of $2000. From a moral standpoint, which one of the
three algorithms do you think is more desirable for deployment in real-world courtrooms?
9 Experiments with Other Group Fairness Notions
For further experimentation, we replicated our study with the Demographic Parity (DP) excluded, and
False Positive Rate Parity (FPP) and False Omission Rate Parity (FOP) included as hypotheses. We
conducted this using the drop-down interface, and with 50 participants for the two settings (criminal
recidivism prediction and skin cancer risk prediction). See Table 7 for the summary.
Table 7: Number of participants matched with each notion with high likelihood (> 80%).
EP FPP FNP FDR FOP None
Crime risk prediction 0% 32% 18% 0% 0% 50%
Cancer risk prediction 28% 18% 0% 2% 0% 52%
Without demographic parity included as a hypotheses, our system has a higher difficulty in match-
ing a fairness hypotheses to a user with high likelihood - supporting our original experiment’s findings
that DP is the most common for users to choose. False Negatives and False Positives have the high-
est proportion of matches. More detailed plots of these additional experimental results are below in
Figure 10 and Figure 11.
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Figure 10: The crime risk prediction scenario—the number of participants matched with each notion
of fairness (y-axis) along with the likelihood levels (x-axis). False positive parity captures the choices
made by the majority of participants.
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Figure 11: The skin cancer risk prediction scenario—the number of participants matched with each
notion of fairness (y-axis) along with the likelihood levels (x-axis). False positive parity captures the
choices made by the majority of participants.
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